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Dividing Loyalties: Caring for Individuals and Populations
Nancy S. Jecker, Ph.D.*
Are health maintenance organization (HMO) physicians obligated to
act exclusively in the interest of the individual patient? Does the mere
existence of financial incentives to limit patient care violate this obligation?
To what extent are doctors responsible for the population of patients
served by a health plan, or for promoting a fair distribution of health care
among society as a whole?
These questions come to the fore in the recent U.S. Supreme Court
case, Pegram v. Herdrich.' In Pegram, Herdrich claimed that the terms of the
Carle HMO organization, rewarding its physician owners for limiting
medical care, entailed an inherent or anticipatory breach of the physician's
fiduciary duty under ERISA. Specifically, the terms of the HMO created
"an incentive to make decisions in the physician's self-interest, rather than
the exclusive interests of plan participants."2 Her claim rested on showing
first, that treatment decisions made by the HMO, acting through its
physician employees, were fiduciary acts under ERISA. Second, her claim
required showing that the terms of the HMO violated fiduciary obligations
under ERISA to act "solely in the interest of' plan participants and
beneficiaries when providing benefits and defraying the reasonable
expenses of administering the plan.3
It is important to underscore that the breach of duty Herdrich alleges
is neither the decision to delay care, nor the harm resulting from this
decision. Thus, "Herdrich does not point to a particular act by any Carle
physician owner as a breach. She does not complain about Pegram's
actions, and.. .the ERISA count could have been brought, and would have
been no different, if Herdrich had never had a sick day in her life."4 The
alleged breach of fiduciary duty consists instead in the HMO's scheme of
awarding physicians a year-end distribution consisting of the profit derived
from the spread between subscription income and expenses of care and
administration. In short, Herdrich alleges that it was wrong for Carle
physicians to care for patients under the influence of incentives that
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enabled them to profit financially from their own choices to minimize the
medical services they provide. She claimed this practice was legally, if not
ethically, wrong because it violated an obligation to act solely for the
patient's interest.
The Supreme Court did not deny that there is a fiduciary duty to act
exclusively for the interest of plan beneficiaries. Instead, it held that
Congress did not intend Carle, or any other HMO, to be treated as a
fiduciary to the extent that it makes "mixed" eligibility decisions acting
through its physicians. Although "pure" treatment decisions are fiduciary
in nature, both "pure" eligibility decisions and "mixed" eligibility and
treatment decisions are not fiduciary in nature. In the case of Herdrich,
Pegram's decision about treating her was inextricably mixed with the
eligibility decision about whether Carle would cover immediate care.
Pegram's treatment decision that Herdrich's condition did not warrant
immediate action implied an eligibility decision that Carle would not cover
immediate care, which it would have covered if the treatment decision had
been otherwise. The Court held that these decisions made by an HMO,
acting through its physician employees, are not fiduciary acts within the
meaning of ERISA.
Did the presence of financial incentives to reduce care violate
Pegram's professional obligation to serve the patient? It is often assumed
that traditional ethics of medicine require physicians to act single
mindedly to promote the interests of the individual patient under their
care. Scholars cite the Hippocratic Oath, which requires physicians to
swear allegiance to patient welfare by "follow[ing] that method of
treatment which, according to my ability and judgment I consider for the
benefit of my patients. 0 Adherents to this approach claim that
"...physicians are required to do everything that they believe may benefit
each patient without regard to costs or other societal considerations.
6
They lament the loss of a historical "golden age" prior to the advent of
managed care, when "it was generally agreed that the doctor's sole
obligation was to take care of each patient...to act only in the patient's
interest. ,7 Since the advent of managed care, physicians have been dubbed
"double agents,"8 responsible not only to advocate for their own patients,
but also to advocate for the entire population of patients served by a health
plan. Proponents of unrestricted patient advocacy assert that if health care
rationing must occur, it is health care organizations and the broader
society, not physicians at the bedside, who should take the initiative in
designing rationing policies. Not only does rationing conflict with the
physician's duty to serve as the patient's advocate, it also risks pitting the
physician's personal financial interests against the patient's medical needs.9
1 (2001)
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Yet in response it has been argued that the professional duty to
advocate on behalf of individual patients is limited, and must be placed in
the broader context of other ethical duties of the physician.0 These
include the duty to promote the welfare of society as a whole, or, at a
minimum, to promote the welfare of the population of patients served by a
health plan. Challengers to "traditional ethics" note that this response
finds roots not only in contemporary debates about the "new ethics" of
managed care, but also in the historical traditions of ethics in medicine.
The Hippocratic corpus itself makes reference to the physician's social
responsibility, citing for example a duty to care for indigent and vulnerable
patients: "Sometimes give your services for nothing .... And if there be an
opportunity of serving one who is a stranger in financial straits, give full
assistance to all such. For where there is love of man, there is also love of
the art."" During the modern era, the newly formed American Medical
Association held in 1847 in its very first Code of Ethics, "As good citizens, it
is the duty of health professionals to be ever vigilant for the welfare of the
community."'2
Managed care itself has a long history in medicine, with the very first
prepaid medical care programs in the United States organized in 1787 by
fraternal societies and mutual benefit associations. Although the dominant
method of physician reimbursement during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries was fee-for-service, physicians also provided care on
credit, offered unlimited services for a fixed-fee per annum, and worked as
"company doctors" for industries such as railroads, mining, and lumber. 3
Under these arrangements, care was managed and methods of physician
reimbursement created incentives for physicians to limit costly care.
Yet the crux of the argument against unrestricted patient advocacy is
not the historical traditions of ethics and medicine. For even if single-
minded advocacy historically occurred and was defensible, the context of
modern medical practice makes this approach untenable. As Jonsen and
Hellegers note, the professional practice of medicine today occurs within a
social context: modern medicine is "an institution that incorporates a
profession."'4 The institutional setting of medicine arises as a modern
necessity because the solo physician diagnosing and treating a single
patient has "gradually been surrounded by the indispensable cooperation
of other people, by accessory producers, by physical environments, by
customary and legal prescriptions." 5 Medicine comprises a social
institution responsible not only for the care of individual sick people, but
also for distributing the benefits and burdens of social life. Professional
accountability is not exclusive to the patient, but to the society that the
institution of medicine serves. As a consequence, the ethics of the medical
3
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profession cannot be adequately understood in a vacuum; it requires a
doctrine of the common good and social justice. While fidelity to one's
patients and to the bond between patient and physician is an important
value, it is not an ethical absolute. Instead, fidelity must be considered in
tandem with other important values, such as social justice.' 6
Moreover, the view of the solo physician as devoid of social and
economic constraints does not accurately portray physicians' own
perceptions of their professional role. 7 Sulmasy and colleagues reported
that 80.8% of physicians randomly selected from seventy-five U.S.
metropolitan areas believed that changes in the health care system in the
past decade have diminished physicians commitment to an ethic of
undivided loyalty to patients.'8 Although physicians worry that financial
incentives to limit care diminish patient trust in them,' 9 research shows that
the vast majority of patients trust their physicians.2 0 Although fee-for-service
indemnity patients have higher levels of trust than salary, capitated, or fee-
for-service managed care patients, the overwhelming majority of patients in
all groups trust their physicians.2'
In response, opponents of managed care might argue that even if trust
remains high, it has declined and will continue to do so. Yet those who
regard managed care as necessary and beneficial can argue that whether
trust has declined is an empirical question that has yet to be answered.
Moreover, even assuming trust has declined since the advent of managed
care, this change may be only temporary. Ultimately, patients (and
physicians) will adapt to and accept managed care practice.
As noted already, contemporary physicians recognize limits to an ethic
of undivided loyalty to patients. These limits may spring from social
responsibilities to use scarce resources in a fair and consistent fashion. Or
they may result from specific obligations to a population of patients served
by a health plan. In addition, society recognizes, even mandates, societal
duties of physicians. For example, in the case of patients with
communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis, society mandates disease
reporting to protect the public's health despite the strong ethic of
confidentiality in the individual physician-patient relationship. 2 In the case
of tuberculosis, the safety of a group of people supercedes the privacy
rights of an individual patient when it comes to a highly communicable
and potentially deadly disease.
Generally speaking, the physician's duty to protect the health and
welfare of the society is owing in part to the fact that physicians are
recipients of numerous benefits from society. Massive amounts of money
are regularly spent to fund medical education, the research on which
medical practice rests, the institutions in which most medical activity
1 (2001)
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occurs, and the demand for medical services. Accepting such societal
benefits places physicians under an obligation to practice medicine in a
manner that benefits, or at least avoids harming, the society granting
them.23
If the above reasoning is sound, there are ethical limits to patient
advocacy. The question remains however, whether financial incentives in
general, and the specific financial incentives under which Pegram
operated, are ethically defensible. Research points to the fact that
physicians who operate under personal financial incentives to reduce
services find these arrangements more ethically troubling than their
colleagues who do not practice under such circumstances.4 Moreover,
incentive structures that align personal financial gain for physicians with
reduced services for patients, may create unique professional challenges.
For many physicians, the professional commitment to serve the
patient's interests includes an obligation to accept personal sacrifice. 25 This
sacrifice may require exposing oneself to medical risks, such as risking
infection when this is necessary to care for the patient. Or personal
sacrifice may entail assuming financial risks, such as risking financial losses
to care for an indigent patient. Physicians who perceive self-sacrifice on
behalf of patients as integral to professional identity may experience
personal financial incentives to reduce care as a threat to their self-
understanding as professionals.26 Rather than putting the patient first,
physicians are invited to put themselves first. Rather than sacrificing
themselves for the patient, physicians are invited to sacrifice the patient for
themselves.
In response, it can be argued that this conception of the physician's
professional role takes for granted that the chief client of the medical
profession is, and should be, the individual patient. But the alternative
conception we have been considering regards the physician's chief clients
to include not only the individual patient, but also the population of
patients served by a health plan, and even the society as a whole. Rather
than regarding the interests of doctor and patient as necessarily
conflicting, we might instead say that the physician's financial interests are
aligned with the interests of the population the physician serves. In other
words, the balance is tipped in favor of one client (the population) rather
than another (the patient) by aligning the physician's financial interests
accordingly. More broadly understood, the entire population of patients
served by a health plan benefits when resources are distributed more fairly
among subscribers. Provided the financial incentives imposed on
physicians improve fairness, the burden of saying no to individual patients
will be eased, although it will remain difficult.
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Consider a somewhat analogous case. The chief client of a lawyer
initially seems to be the party whose case the lawyer represents or to whom
the lawyer gives advice. However,
Lawyers are told and they announce in their self-descriptions and codes
of conduct that they have obligations to the whole justice system;
therefore, there are things that they as professionals may not ethically do,
even if doing them would advance the situation of the party they
represent or advise. So it appears that the answer to the question about
the chief client of the legal profession is complex, involving not only the
persons lawyers represent or advise but the whole justice system and/or
perhaps the whole larger community served by that system.'
Once this complexity emerges in case law, analogous cases in medicine
appear more complex. Rather than viewing Pegram's dilemma exclusively
as a conflict between herself and her patient, the dilemma can now be
recast in a fuller form. Should the financial incentives under which the
physician operates be balanced in favor of the individual patient the doctor
cares for, or the wider population of patients the physician serves? The
physician can ethically support putting the population first or putting the
patient first in a particular case without basing either decision on putting
herself first. According to this approach, personal financial gains and losses
are associated with favoring one client group over another, not merely with
favoring oneself over one's client.
If these arguments are compelling, the presence of financial incentives
to reduce patient care can be ethically defensible. On the one hand, the
requirements of social justice make the position of unrestricted patient
advocacy untenable in the context of resource or fiscal scarcity. On the
other hand, the existence of financial incentives to reduce individual
patient care is compatible with a conception of professional identity that
requires putting clients first. Ultimately, the physician must decide whether
to put individuals or populations first, irrespective of personal financial
reward.
If the mere existence of financial incentives to limit care does not
suffice to show that Pegram violated her fiduciary duty to Herdrich, how
should we judge Pegram's actions? How should we judge the particular
incentives the Carle HMO established? Even if the particular financial
incentives Pegram operated under were morally licit, the decision to delay
Herdrich's ultrasound by requiring that it be performed at a facility more
than fifty miles away may be unethical for reasons we have not considered.
Pegram may have wrongly based the decision to delay care on maximizing
her personal financial gain. Pegram may have advocated too zealously for
i1(2001l)
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the population of patients served by the HMO. She may have medically
misjudged the urgency of Herdrich's situation. Pegram may have avoided
making hard choices by denying the risks associated with her decision.
That is, she may have wanted and believed she could have it all: reduced
costs for the HMO, personal financial rewards for herself, and quality care
for the patient.
These points obviously raise more questions than they answer.
Furthermore, even if it is permissible to hold physicians accountable for
cost containment by creating financial incentives to limit care, it does not
follow that it is permissible to hold physicians alone accountable.28 HMOs
are also ethically responsible for their influence on clinical decisions and
treatment outcomes. HMOs should not, for example, be allowed to create
unethical financial incentives to plan physicians with impunity. Although
Pegram may exert an influence on Carle's financial incentives (e.g., by
choosing to accept or appeal its terms), Pegram did not establish these
incentives. As long as the Carle HMO itself is not held legally accountable,
physicians and patients have no legal remedy for unethical financial
incentives. The concern this raises is that ERISA does not regulate how
HMOs create incentive structures to motivate contracting physician's
compliance with cost containment measures. And the ERISA preemption
makes it more difficult for states to regulate such compensation and
incentive arrangements. Some commentators conclude that "[f]rom a
policy perspective, ERISA has created a regulatory vacuum in which states
cannot act and there is no comparable federal regulatory mechanism.
The best recourse for physicians includes collectively designing care
management practices, such as those that are currently being developed
under the heading of practice guidelines, protocols, critical pathways, and
disease state management. The advantage of these approaches is that they
increase the value of services delivered to patients through improved
outcomes and reduced costs. They also provide information for physicians
and managed care plans about standards of medical practice. And they
involve physicians in designing the rules to which they will be subject. To
the extent that physicians work in tandem with managed care plans to
establish guidelines for the care of patients, they will be better able to
make individual treatment decisions in a fair and consistent manner.
In summary, I have argued that physicians are not ethically obligated
to act exclusively in the interests of their individual patients. The "mixed"
nature of many medical decisions reflects the fact that physicians serve
multiple clients: individual patients, patient populations, and the society at
large. The existence of financial incentives to limit advocacy on behalf of
one client group in order to achieve a fairer balance among all groups is
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consistent with standards ofjustice in health care. Finding the most ethical
balance among the multiple clients that physicians serve is still
undetermined. A fair process for making this determination should involve
not only physicians and health care plans, but ultimately the entire
population of patients affected by these decisions.
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